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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to test the hypothesis that software piracy rats are lower in 
more intelligent nations. Thus, we econometrically estimate the effect of national IQ on software 
piracy rates, using data for 102 nations for the year 2011. Our findings offer strong support for 
the assertion that intelligence is inversely related to the software piracy rates. After controlling 
for the potential effect of outlier nations in the sample, software piracy rate declines by about 5.3 
percentage points if national IQ increases by 10 points. 
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1. Introduction 
From a legal point of view, the intellectual property rights cover three distinct sets of 
rights: trademark, patents, and copyright (Besen & Raskind, 1991). Copyright refers to types of 
commodity information/intellectual property goods, having certain features. Information goods 
have two important public goods characteristics. First, their consumption is inherently non-rival.  
That is the use that one person makes of a piece of information does not decrease the possibility 
of use by others. Second, information and intellectual property goods may be non-excludable in 
the sense that the producer of the intellectual property goods is often unable to exclude non-
payers from consuming goods without due authorization (Varian, 1998). Intellectual property 
law responds to this problem by giving producers certain exclusive rights that exclude non-
payers from certain uses of their intellectual property goods. Although, assigning IPRs is not the 
only way to deal with exclusion (for instance, bundling). IPRs law recognizes that no exclusion 
would create poor incentives for the creation of IP goods. But at the same time, permanent 
intellectual property rights would lead to the standard deadweight loss of a monopoly. Thus, an 
adequate IP system must ensure a fair balance between these two conflicting objectives.  
As regards intellectual property protection, one serious concern for copyright holders is 
piracy; that is, the unauthorized use of copyrighted goods. When a legal copyright exists, those 
who wish to gain access to the original copyrighted work must pay the copyright holder the 
access price. If an individual obtains access without paying a price, that person is said to have 
incurred an act of piracy. Even though piracy occurs for all types of intellectual property and can 
take many forms depending on the access type and intellectual property mechanism (Watt, 
2001), one of the most worrying areas nowadays is certainly the piracy of business software 
applications. Business software piracy has been related to economic growth (Andrés & Goel, 
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2012), shadow economy (Goel and Nelson, 2012) scientific output (Asongu, 2014), innovation 
(Banerjee & Chatterjee, 2010), and industry profits (Gomes et al., 2013). It has been calculated 
that for each authentic copy distributed there are up to 10 illicit copies downloaded from internet 
or copied from friends or members of family (Reavis & Rumelt, 1991). According to BSA (2011 
p. 1) "[t]he global piracy rate for PC software hovers at 42 percent [and] [t]he commercial value 
of this shadow market of pirated software climbed ... to $63.4 billion in 2011". 
Consequently, investigating the determinants and effects of software piracy has been 
paramount object of empirical studies over the last decade (see e.g. Andrés. 2006a,b; Goel & 
Nelson, 2012; Bezmen et al., 2006; Chen et al., 2010; Arai, 2011; Boyce, 2011)1. By and large, 
related studies show that economic development, institutional arrangements, political regimes 
and cultural proxies are determinants of 'softlifting' behavior on a cross-country level. Our 
research offers a quite different avenue in understanding the cross-national variations in software 
piracy rates. We depart from a celebrated article by Lynn & Vanhanen (2002 p. 194) who claim 
that "national [intelligence levels] are a causal factor responsible for the differences in economic 
development". Based on conclusions formulated by Lynn & Vanhanen (2002) we conjecture that 
intelligence may be important antecedent of software piracy through which it has impact on 
economic growth and innovation. Notably, we presume that there are a number of channels 
through which intelligence is related to software piracy, the first of which is economic 
development. Related literature reports that economic development is one of the most robust 
predictors of software piracy rates. Economic wealth, proxied by GDP per capita, is statistically 
significantly and negatively associated with cross-national piracy rates (e.g., Andrés, 2006b; 
Andrés & Goel, 2012; Bagchi et al., 2006; Robertson et al., 2008). On the other hand, in their 
celebrated articles devoted to the understanding of intelligence Lynn & Vanhanen (2002, 2006) 
                                                          
1see e.g. Gomes et al. (2015) for an excellent survey on empirical literature which explains software piracy. 
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suggest national IQ as an explanation for cross nations variations in per-person gross domestic 
product (GDP) and other country-level economic outcomes. Similarly, Ram (2007), using data 
for 98 nations, reports that IQ has statistically significant effect on economic growth. As 
cognitive abilities have positive effect on economic development, we may conjecture that 
intelligence will be inversely related to software piracy rates. More recently, Meisenberg (2012) 
p. 103 concludes that "high IQ is associated not only with high per-capita GDP ... but also with 
more equal income distribution".  
Another potential impact of intelligence on software piracy rates is quality of institutions. 
Whereas weak institutions and poor policies lead to greater 'soflifting' (Kovačić, 2007; Andrés, 
2006a, there is confirmation that strong and stable institutions, competent enforcement 
authorities and anxiety of prosecution reduces the likelihood of infringement (Marron & Steel, 
2000; Lysonski & Durvasula, 2008). Indeed, Kanyama (2014), using data on 164 nations for the 
years 2006 - 2010, finds that intelligence has positive impact on quality of institutions. Similarly, 
Salahodjaev (2015a), using Barro type growth regressions, shows that the effect democracy on 
economic growth is mediated by intelligence. In particular, intelligence reduces the negative 
association between democracy and economic growth in weak democratic economies. On the 
microeconomic level high IQ (educated) individuals have higher levels of political participation 
(e.g. Milligan et al., 2004). This is especially important because securing intellectual property 
rights in the digital era demands intellectual skills and competence as involved government 
authorities need to recognize the perceptions and rules balancing the rights of individual agents 
and of general users.  
We may then conjecture that intelligence has negative effect on software piracy as high 
IQ individuals are more competent (Luciano et al., 2006; Soto-Calvo et al., 2015). For example, 
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Sub (1996) finds that intelligence is among predictors problem solving competences. Similarly, 
Rigas et al. (2002) report positive correlations between IQ and problem-solving experiment 
(r=0.43 for Kühlhaus scenario; r=0.34 for NEWFIRE scenario). 
Finally, software piracy is also symbolized by criminal endeavor, a behavior that has also 
been related to intelligence. For instance, Templer & Rushton (2011) report a negative 
correlation between IQ and different measures of crime (murder, rape, robbery and assault) in the 
USA. Earlier Rushton & Templer (2009 p. 345) conclude that "[c]ross-national differences in 
rate of violent crime (murder, rape, and serious assault) were significantly correlated with a 
country's IQ scores (mean r =  .25, such that the higher the IQ, the lower the rate of crime)". 
Bartels et al. (2010) tested the hypothesis that violent and property crimes rate are lower in states 
with higher IQ scores using data for the years 2005-2006. They showed that National 
Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) reading and math standardized test scores a proxy 
for calculating IQ estimates has significant and negative effect on crime rates in the USA. 
Salahodjaev (2015b) provides evidence on the impact of intelligence on the size of shadow 
economy. The author applies OLS method and an instrumental variable (IV) 2SLS regression 
technique. The estimates show that the negative effect of intelligence remains robust when 
controlled for conventional determinants of an underground economy. In addition, intelligence 
predicts the likelihood of involvement in criminal activities (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994) 
instrumental to reduce the software piracy rates.  
This article starts from the following hypothesis: 
Does any association exist between IQ and software piracy rate at a national level? 
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2. Data and methods 
Dependent variable 
The data on software piracy rate is obtained from BSA (2012). It measures the percentage 
of software that is being used illegally, without the purchase of a license. This variable ranges 
from 0 % (no piracy) to 100 % (i.e. all software installed is pirated). The BSA measures the 
piracy of commercial software. These estimates are one of the most reliable ones and have been 
used largely in empirical papers (for instance Andrés, 2006a,b; Andrés & Goel, 2012; Goel & 
Nelson, 2012; Gomes et al., 2013a; Banerjee et al., 2005; and Andrés & Asongu, 2013)2. In the 
current paper, we focus on end-user piracy where consumers will use the software at home, and 
software is not sold to the others (commercial piracy).The underlying method for estimating the 
piracy rate and commercial value of unlicensed software in a nation is as follows: the amount of 
PC software distributed subtracted from the amount of software legally obtained. Once the 
amount of unlicensed software is known, the PC software piracy rate is estimated as a share of 
total software installed for 108 nations. 
 
Independent variable 
The key independent variable is average national intelligence, measured by national IQ 
scores. We draw the cross-national dataset on national IQs from Lynn & Vanhanen (2012). The 
authors update a previous edition of national IQ data by Lynn & Vanhanen (2002). Their latest 
dataset contains intelligence quotient scores for 190 counties and has been extensively used in 
related literature over the past decade (Lynn, 2012; Daniele, 2013; Salahodjaev & Azam, 2015; 
                                                          
2
 See Traphagan and Griffith (1998) and Png (2010) for a discussion on the reliability of piracy data.   
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Obydenkova & Salahodjaev, 2016; Salahodjaev, 2016). Hereafter, after elimination potentially 
missing observations for the piracy rate, IQ scores extend from 64 in Cameroon to 107.1 in 
Singapore.  
 
Control variables 
First we control for GDP per capita. Cross-national studies report that software piracy 
rates are inversely related to the level of economic development (Andrés, 2006b; Bagchi et al., 
2017; Kigerl, 2013).  
Related studies document that nations with lower economic opportunities and more 
inequality are associated with greater levels of software infringement (Andres, 2006a; Chen et 
al., 2010). We use index of economic freedom (EFI) from Heritage Foundation as a proxy for 
economic freedom and opportunity. The EFI covers 10 freedoms - from property rights to 
entrepreneurship in majority nations of the world. Furthermore, software piracy rates are lower 
in nations with British civil law. Indeed, nations with British common law recognize the 
significance of intellectual property rights. Thus, we use binary variable for nations with British 
common law.  
To investigate the impact of political regimes on software piracy rate we use democratic 
index from Freedom House. The democracy index is estimated as the average of civil liberties 
and political rights. Finally, to investigate the role of corruption in software piracy we use 
Corruption perceptions index (CPI) from Transparency International. Table 1 presents 
descriptive statistics.  
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Methodology 
Based on this work and the discussions above, the software piracy rate is estimated by the 
following econometric model: 
iii XIQSP   '  
whereSP is the software piracy rate in country i in 2011, IQ is the measure of 
intelligence, X is the vector of control variables, and ε is a random error term. Summary statistics 
and the correlation matrix are presented in Tables 1 and 2 accordingly.  
 
Table 1. 
Summary statistics 
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. 
Piracy Software piracy rate (%) 58.92 21.52 
IQ Nation IQ score 84.10 10.85 
Economic Development GDP per capita, PPP '000 $ 10.65 15.82 
EFI Economic Freedom Index 59.75 11.78 
British civil law 
Dichotomous variable for countries with 
British civil law 
0.34 0.47 
Democracy  Average of civil rights and political liberties 3.67 1.97 
CPI Corruption Perceptions Index 4.02 2.10 
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Figure 1.Intelligence and piracy 
Source: Lynn &Vanhanen (2012); BSA (2012) 
Table 2. 
Correlation matrix 
 I II III IV V VI 
Piracy  1.0000      
Intelligence -0.6566 1.0000     
Economic development -0.7813 0.5383 1.0000    
EFI -0.7305 0.4955 0.5729 1.0000   
British civil law -0.1094 -0.1694 0.0106 0.1283 1.0000  
Democracy  -0.6346 0.5092 0.4552 0.5521 -0.0807 1.0000 
CPI -0.8604 0.6299 0.8269 0.7715 0.1406 0.5931 
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3. Main results 
The main econometric results are presented in Table 3. All estimations were conducted 
by using STATA. The fit of all the estimated equations is decent, as shown by the 
correspondingstatistics in Table 3. R2 is better than or equal to 0.75 in all regression 
models.Column 1 displays the coefficients from estimating equation (1), where only GDP per 
capita is added as independent variable. As conjectured, both intelligence and economic 
development are significantly and negatively linked to software piracy rates. Piracy is lower in 
more prosperous nations. Consumers might view pirated software as an inferior good.This 
finding is consisted with other cross sectional studies (Banerjee et al., 2005; Goel and Nelson, 
2012; Andrés and Goel, 2012). A 10 points increase in IQ is associated with an 7.9 percentage 
point reduction in software piracy, while a one standard deviation increase in economic 
development reduces software piracy  by 11.83 percentage points (approximately half of a 
standard deviation).  
In column 2, legal antecedents of software piracy are incorporated into regression. The 
first of these institutional proxies is EFI, while the remaining two are democracy index and a 
dichotomous variable for British civil law nations. The estimates show that these three variables 
are statistically significant, demonstrating a negative association with software piracy. 
Intelligence is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level.  
Finally, in column 3,we add the corruption perceptions index (CPI). In corrupt countries 
bureaucrat may act in a deceptive way and involve in bribery with infringing economic agents. 
Indeed, related literature supplies evidencethatnations with rampant levels of bribery encounter 
problems in tracking and punishing piracy (Robertson et al., 2008). Our estimates show that 
software piracy is higher in more corrupt nations or piracy increases with corruption. This 
11 
 
implies that pirates perceive the presence of corruption to lower the expected costs of 
punishment, while at the same time increasing its potential returns.. These results are in line with 
previous empirical studies (Banerjee et al., 2005; Andrés and Goel, 2011). Intelligence preserves 
its negative association, albeit at a 5% level of statistical significance. Thus, the estimates in 
Table 3 suggest that intelligence is significantly linked to software piracy at the cross-national 
sample.  
 
Table 3. 
IQ and software piracy rates: OLS regressions 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
IQ -0.7905*** -0.5574*** -0.4495** 
 (0.2180) (0.1701) (0.1862) 
Economic development -0.7481*** -0.5208*** -0.3602*** 
 (0.1049) (0.0752) (0.1031) 
EFI  -0.5236*** -0.3443** 
  (0.1369) (0.1386) 
Democracy   -2.3708*** -2.0162** 
  (0.8076) (0.7774) 
British civil law  -6.4710** -4.7166* 
  (2.7382) (2.6401) 
CPI   -2.5441** 
   (1.1709) 
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Constant 140.8315*** 161.0631*** 147.6109*** 
 (18.4680) (14.6373) (15.7226) 
N 107 102 102 
adj. R2 0.6734 0.7920 0.8007 
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
4. Robustness tests 
First the reader may argue that OLS regression does not sufficiently address the 
endogeneity of intelligence to software piracy, and therefore, does not definitely determine a 
causal effect. To control for potential endogeneity and a simultaneity that may be also caused by 
unobserved variable correlated with IQ and software piracy, we estimate our econometric model 
using two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression, where intelligence is taken to be endogenous. In 
line with related studies, we use per capita energy consumption and continental dummies - which 
are highly correlated with national IQ scores, and use these instruments to explore the impact of 
intelligence on software piracy. Empirical studies show that these instruments are correlated with 
IQ but not with the errors of regression (Salahodjaev, 2015b; Kanyama, 2014). The results 
reported in Table 4 suggest that intelligence is negatively linked with software piracy even when 
we address the endogeneity problem. A 10 points increase in instrumented intelligence is now 
associated with 6.2 point percentage point reduction in software piracy.  
The adjusted R-squared, an indicator that quantifies how well a model fits the data, - 
goodness-of-fit for the IV analysis from the first stage regression indicates that the instruments 
explain nearly 72% of the variation in IQ. Moreover, our instruments are statistically significant 
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at the conventional levels. For example, a one standard deviation increase in per person energy 
consumption is associated with approximately 2.7point increase in IQ. The usefulness of the 
instruments is also supported by the first stage "F value" (F=22.90; p=.00)3.  
On the other hand, outlier and influential data points can have a substantial influence on 
estimates and inferences from cross-national data (Rodrik, 2012). Indeed, in the mean regression 
approach the effect of outlier on the estimate rises with the square of its size. For example, 
Swartz and Welsch (1986, p. 171) note: “OLS and many other commonly used maximum 
likelihood techniques have an unbounded influence function; any small subset of the [extreme] 
data can have an arbitrarily large [effect] on their coefficient estimates.”. To address this 
limitation of OLS regression we use robust regression (RR). RR starts by fitting the model, 
estimating Cook's D and removing any data points for which D>1. Thenceforth RR runs 
iteratively: it fits a regression, estimates case weights from absolute error terms, and re-estimates 
the model again using those weights. These iterations end when maximum adjustment in weights 
falls below tolerance.  
The estimates reported in Column 2 suggest that intelligence is negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. The numerical interpretation is that software piracy rate declines by 
about 5.3 percentage points if national IQ increases by 10 points.  
Finally, we tested the robustness of our results to the inclusion of additional control 
variables.Illegal copying might respond to legal tendencies towards or against protected IPRs. 
Previous empirical literature suggests that stronger IPRs protection reduces the rates of software 
piracy (Andrés, 2006b). Indeed, the degree of economic development might be also correlated 
with judicial and policing maturity, and it is possible to interpret it as a proxy variable for 
property rights enforcement. For that purpose, we include the IPR enforcement index (IPR) 
                                                          
3
 Available from authors upon request 
14 
 
collected by the World Economic Forum (WEF) as a measure of the general strength of IPRs 
protection across countries.This index is built based on answers from local professionals and is 
bi-annually published in the WEF annual Global Competitiveness Report. Furthermore, this 
index captures the enforcement component of IPR protection which reacts the current law 
perspectives and practices on its protection. The survey asked whether, if intellectual property 
protection in your country is: (1=weak or non-existent, 7=equal to the world’s most stringent). 
Higher values of the index indicate higher levels of IPRs protection. Responses from the experts 
are tabulated and averaged for each country in question. In addition to this, following Goel and 
Nelson (2012), we also control fora measure of punishment, the effectiveness (impartiality) of 
courts (Courts). This cross-country index is expected to capture the potential punishments (costs) 
for piracy – impartial courts lowers piracy by prosecuting more pirates and dissuading potential 
pirates.  
The results in Column 3 indicate that intelligence remains statistically significant 
although at a 5% level, and has direct effect on piracy rates even after controlling for a wide 
specter of institutional antecedents of software piracy. Turning to additional control variables, we 
find that the results in line with our predictions. In addition, we also document that stronger IPR 
protection has negative impact on software piracy rates, as one would expect (Andrés, 2006b).  
Table 4 
IQ and software piracy rates: robustness test 
 (1) 
IV 2SLS 
(2) 
RREG 
(3) 
RREG 
IQ -0.6192** -0.5318*** -0.3571** 
 (0.2555) (0.1504) (0.1575) 
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Economic development -0.3661*** -0.3240*** -0.2691*** 
 (0.1027) (0.0985) (0.0957) 
EFI -0.3685** -0.3388** -0.2005 
 (0.1640) (0.1488) (0.1545) 
Democracy  -1.6614* -1.7942*** -0.7305 
 (0.9748) (0.6816) (0.7184) 
British civil law -5.8598* -3.1040 -5.4095** 
 (3.0221) (2.4605) (2.4543) 
CPI -2.2967* -2.9002*** -4.5367*** 
 (1.1796) (1.0980) (1.2711) 
Courts   5.5995*** 
   
(1.5542) 
IPR index   -4.8070*** 
   (1.4436) 
Constant 161.9489*** 154.4766*** 134.3495*** 
 (20.6562) (13.6451) (14.7994) 
N 98 102 96 
adj. R2 0.7994 0.8121 0.8223 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this article we utilize cross-national statistics on the software piracy rate, to offer a 
novel estimate of the association between intelligence, proxied by national IQ scores, and 
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'softlifting'. We find that intelligence has statistically significant negative impact on piracy rates. 
We also conclude that the estimates remain robust when we address potential endogeneity of IQ 
and for the existence of outlier countries in the sample.  
On the other hand, it is crucial to highlight that albeit our findings suggest that more 
intelligent societies are inversely associated with the software piracy rates, this should not be 
taken as universal evidence that society with higher intelligent quotient is a requirement to 
alleviate software piracy. Our findings indicate that if ruling elite enforces policies to decrease 
software piracy, intelligence provides a credible proxy of the degree of consent of such policies. 
Indeed, agents with higher cognitive abilities are more politically active.  
Our estimates extend the findings of Salahodjaev (2015b), Potrafke (2012) and Kanyama 
(2014), who show that intelligence predicts rent-seeking behavior, corruption and quality of 
institutions. 
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